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Abstract
As a counterpoint to Prashantham and Birkinshaw, I present an alternative
model of MNE–SME cooperation where either type of firms can take the role of
content provider or distributor. I argue that MNEs will interact with SMEs when
there are differences in optimal scale between the content creation and
distribution stages of the value chain, and it is not feasible or efficient for either
party to vertically integrate between these two stages. I then build two 2 9 2
bundling models, one in which the SME provides content and the MNE
distributes it, and another with the reverse configuration. In these 2 9 2s the
axes are the transactional properties of the two complementary inputs, content
and distribution, that MNEs and SMEs bundle to create value. I show that these
models can explain the forms taken by MNE–SME cooperation and their
dynamics.
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INTRODUCTION
Prashantham and Birkinshaw (2019) (P&B) present a general model
of cooperation between multinational firms (MNEs) and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), which for them are of two types,
technology-intensive firms (e.g., Monteiro & Birkinshaw, 2017)
and global value chain subcontractors (e.g., Rugman & D’Cruz,
1997). They address both the forms taken by this cooperation and its
dynamics, and then discuss how their model can be applied to the
pursuit of theUnitedNations SustainableDevelopmentGoals. Along
with P&B I assume that all MNEs are large firms – although we know
that this is not necessarily the case (e.g., Dimitratos, Johnson, Slow&
Young, 2003). So in the rest of this counterpoint, ‘‘MNE’’ and ‘‘large
firm’’ are used interchangeably. SMEs are sometimes young firms
that, while still small, are nonetheless eager to grow, but also older
firms that are permanently small and mid-sized.1
I start by summarizing P&B’s two-by-two model of MNE–SME
cooperation in which the axes are an MNE’s intended strategy
(exploration vs. exploitation) and an SME’s intended focus
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(domestic vs. international), and discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of their model. I then
present an alternative model of MNE–SME cooper-
ation. In this bundling model (Hennart, 2009), the
axes are the transactional characteristics of two
inputs, content and distribution, which MNEs and
SMEs bundle. I show that the model can explain
the forms that this bundling takes and their
dynamics. Because SMEs can be either upstream
or downstream from MNEs, I present not one but
two two-by-twos, one in which the SME is posi-
tioned upstream and provides content – products
and services – to the MNE which distributes it, and
one in which the SME is a downstream distributor
of MNE–created content. The model predicts the
form MNE–MNE cooperation should take given the
efficiency of the markets for the inputs (content
and distribution) contributed by MNEs and SMEs.
Using six examples, I then consider the factors that
affect the evolution of that cooperation. I show
that its instability results from changes in the
transactional properties of the partner contribu-
tions and the inability of their jointly chosen
governance institution to accommodate them. I
conclude by discussing the insights into MNE–SME
cooperation that my bundling approach provides.2
PRASHANTHAM AND BIRKINSHAW’S MODEL
OF MNE–SME COOPERATION
P&B present a two-by-two table where the axes are
an MNE’s objective, i.e., whether it seeks explo-
ration or exploitation, and an SME’s ambition, i.e.,
whether it wants to expand internationally or
consolidate domestically. The table yields four
quadrants. In two of them MNE–SME cooperation
is deemed to be stable and in equilibrium, while in
the remaining two it is unstable.
P&B expect equilibrium when an MNE in explo-
ration mode – looking for new knowledge inputs –
cooperates with an internationally-oriented SME
that wants to use the MNE to reach foreign
consumers, either directly, or indirectly by incor-
porating its products and services into the MNE’s
own products (Quadrant 3). P&B give the example
of a pharmaceutical MNE (Ciba-Geigy) cooperating
with a biotech SME (Alza) and argue that while
differences in size may cause communication prob-
lems, their cooperation will be stable because they
both want to expand internationally. Equilibrium
can also be expected when an MNE in exploitation
mode cooperates with a domestically-oriented SME
that feeds the MNE’s global supply chain (Quadrant
1). P&B argue that such cooperation is stable be-
cause ‘‘neither party is seeking changes to the status
quo’’, the MNE wants access to reliable comple-
mentary products, while the SME has no ambition
to expand internationally.
In contrast to the above, cooperation is deemed
unstable when an MNE in exploitation mode
collaborates with an SME with international ambi-
tions (Quadrant 2). P&B argue that because it is in
exploitation mode, the MNE is unwilling to help
the SME upgrade and internationalize. P&B’s exam-
ple is Skelta, a Bangalore software firm that initially
had trouble getting Microsoft to support its global
ambitions (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015). Coop-
eration is also likely to be unstable when the
situation is reversed, when an MNE is in explo-
ration mode eager to tap the capabilities of an SME,
but the SME is domestically oriented (Quadrant 4).
They argue that the SME is unlikely to trust the
MNE and will consequently refuse to collaborate
(they cite O’Dwyer & O’Flynn, 2005).
P&B then look at the dynamics of MNE–SME
cooperation. They describe four paths. Path A
(Quadrant 2 to 1) is when, faced with an MNE’s
exploitation stance, an SME abandons its ambition
to upgrade and globalize, resigning itself to a less
innovative role; and Path B (Quadrant 4 to 1) when
an MNE gives up persuading a domestically-ori-
ented SME to upgrade its products, and both parties
settle on ‘‘low level linkages’’. Path C (Quadrant 2 to
3) is when SME managers with global ambitions
seek out MNE counterparts who may be willing to
hear them out, and are able in the end to persuade
them to tender contracts for more innovative
products, while Path D (Quadrant 3 to 4) is when
an MNE works on its interface with an SME, and
that SME becomes more confident and accepts to
collaborate on more technologically-intensive
tasks.
Evaluation of Prashantham and Birkinshaw’s
Model
I applaud P&B for explicitly acknowledging the role
played by firms that provide complementary
resources to MNEs. As I wrote in my 2009 JIBS
article entitled Down with MNE-centric theories, too
much of IB theory assumes that MNEs are always in
the driver’s seat. The narrative is that they unilat-
erally choose their foreign market entry mode – for
instance the level of ownership they want to hold
in their foreign affiliate – based on their tolerance
for risk and need for control. This overlooks the fact
that to sell in foreign markets MNEs must interact
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with local owners of complementary inputs. So
MNEs do not always joint venture because they
want to, but often because this is the only effective
way to motivate local firms to supply complemen-
tary inputs (Hennart, 2009). According to Buckley
and Prashantham (2016: 54), global value chain
scholars have also focused on orchestrating MNEs,
assuming that local partners are passive price and
quality takers. One of the merits of P&B’s article is
that they do not take such an MNE-centric view.
Rather, they consider interactions between MNEs
and other firms, specifically SMEs.
Nonetheless, P&B’s model has a number of
limitations. First, P&B focus on the relationship
between MNEs and innovative SMEs on one hand,
and between value chain- orchestrating MNEs and
upstream SME suppliers, on the other. In both cases
MNEs are downstream, i.e., customer-facing, and
SMEs upstream. P&B’s model does not include cases
where MNEs are upstream content providers, and
SMEs are downstream and customer-facing. This
latter configuration is quite common in interna-
tional business since, for many products and in
many countries, MNEs rely on SMEs to deliver their
products to customers, either as local distributors or
as local service providers – franchisees for example.
These cases would fall into P&B’s Quadrant 1 –
MNEs in exploitation mode and SMEs with a local
focus. I will show, however, that in contrast to
P&B’s predictions, the relationship between MNEs
and SMEs in this quadrant is not always stable.
Second, while two-by-twos are an effective way to
explain relationships, the insight they provide
depends on the choice of axes. P&B posit that one
axis affecting the stability of the MNE–SME rela-
tionships is the MNE’s choice between an explo-
ration and an exploitation strategy. The distinction
is ambiguous. One might think that for P&B MNEs
that engage in exploration are seeking new ideas
and knowledge to develop new products and
services, while they follow exploitation strategies
when they sell these new products and services to
final customers. In that case, the two strategies are
complementary, not mutually exclusive – which is
problematic since mutual exclusivity is necessary in
a two-by-two. Consider Apple. It seeks applications
(apps) for its mobile phones, so P&B would say that
it is engaging in exploration when dealing with
SME app developers. But Apple seeks apps because
it wants to sell phones, as having apps increases the
desirability of their models. When it comes to apps,
Apple serves as a distributor, allowing app designers
to access final customers, which obviously should
be seen as exploitation. So when Apple contracts
for apps, it is engaging in both exploration and
exploitation. Is it possible that for P&B what
differentiates exploration from exploitation is the
type of product or service sought? P&B seem to
suggest that MNEs in exploration mode are seeking
high-tech knowledge inputs, while those in
exploitation mode are looking for low-tech pro-
duce, materials, and parts. If this latter interpreta-
tion is correct, it is not clear what makes the two
strategies conceptually different, since in both cases
an MNE assembles inputs obtained from SMEs into
outputs sold to final users.
An additional problem with the exploration–
exploitation dichotomy is the meaning of the term
‘‘exploration.’’ Does exploration means accessing
knowledge, or internalizing it? As shown in Zeng
and Hennart (2002), the two are not the same.
Consider a pharmaceutical MNE striking an alli-
ance with a biotechnology SME. It may want to
absorb knowledge from that SME through full or
partial acquisition, or to surreptitiously appropriate
it within an equity joint venture (EJV). Or it may
seek licensing agreements to access external drugs
to fill its distribution network without any desire to
absorb the knowledge embedded in them. These
strategies might all be called exploration, but, as we
will see, they have very different consequences for
the feasibility and stability of agreements between
MNEs and SMEs. EJVs set up by MNEs to expropri-
ate the knowledge contributed by SME partners are
unlikely to be long-lasting (Reich & Mankin, 1986;
Zeng & Hennart, 2002), but licensing agreements
signed by MNEs eager to complete a product line
might be.
The other axis in P&B’s two-by-two is SME intent.
Since an SME’s intent reflects in part its experience
with MNEs, as P&B’s analysis of the dynamics of
cooperation shows, this runs the risk of being
tautological. For instance, P&B argue that cooper-
ation in Quadrant 4 – an MNE in exploration mode
and an SME with a local focus – is unstable because
as they put it, ‘‘SMEs are suspicious of MNE
motives’’. But why would they harbor such suspi-
cion in Quadrant 4 and not in Quadrant 1? P&B
assume Quadrant 1 relationships will be stable be-
cause the MNE is in exploration mode, and the SME
has global ambitions, but they overlook two poten-
tial difficulties. One is whether an MNE’s strategy of
exploration is of the internalization or access type.
As argued above, attempts at the former will either
lead to the bankruptcy of the cooperating SME or to
its withdrawal from the agreement (e.g., Alvarez &
A bundling model of MNE–SME interactions Jean-François Hennart
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Barney, 2001). The second potential difficulty is
whether the type of market access the MNE can
provide the SME meets its internationalization
needs. As we will see later, these two types of
problems led to the dissolution of the Ciba–Alza
EJV.
P&B emphasize the role played by the lack of
interface between MNEs and SMEs. While this can
cause problems, I believe that there are more
fundamental reasons why cooperation between
MNEs and SMEs may not satisfy both parties, and
they are revealed by focusing on the transactional
characteristics of the inputs exchanged and on the
governance institutions used to organize their
transfer. On this P&B are silent. But, as we will
see, actors choose particular governance institu-
tions in response to particular transaction charac-
teristics, and each governance institution has
specific advantages and drawbacks.3 The way the
chosen institution is structured has also a signifi-
cant impact on the magnitude of gains it generates
for the interacting parties and hence on the stabil-
ity of cooperation (Hennart & Zeng, 2005).
Lastly, P&B seem to imply that stability should be
the ultimate goal of cooperating parties. This is a
simplification. Barriers to exit may make some
stable relationships temporarily unprofitable for
one or both of the parties. While some unstable re-
lationships are lose–lose, others are win–win. I
return to this in the concluding section.
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF MNE–SME
INTERACTION
As with P&B, my goal is to explain the forms taken
by MNE–SME cooperation and their dynamic. To
do so, I first ask when cooperation between MNEs
and SMEs will take place, and under which condi-
tions it can potentially create value. I argue that
cooperation will occur when it is more efficient for
both parties to cooperate as separate entities than
for either party to integrate into the other’s busi-
ness. Why does this cooperation have the potential
to create value? Along with P&B, I think that it is
because MNEs and SMEs have complementary
capabilities, with SMEs generally more nimble and
creative than MNEs, and MNEs specializing in
activities where large size is critical. Under which
conditions will this potential value be realized?
Transaction cost theory argues that value creation
is not automatic but requires that parties choose a
governance institution that matches the transac-
tional characteristics of the inputs contributed by
the partners (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Hennart,
1982, 2015b). In the absence of such a match, the
cooperation will fail to generate enough value to
make it sustainable. To predict which governance
institution is optimal requires understanding their
comparative advantage, so I briefly explain how
EJVs differ from contracts. Not only do parties need
to choose the appropriate governance institution,
they also need to carefully craft the institution they
have chosen. I therefore discuss next how EJVs can
be structured to handle the problems they usually
face. With these building blocks in place, I develop
a bundling model (Hennart, 2009) that predicts
which governance institution is optimal given the
comparative advantage of each governance institu-
tion and the transactional characteristics of the
inputs contributed by both parties. Because, as
shown in Figure 1, MNE–SME cooperation takes
place under two generic configurations, one in
which SMEs are upstream in the value chain, and
sell content to MNEs which then provide distribu-
tion access (Type 1), and one in which the roles are
reversed, with MNEs providing content and SMEs
access to final customers (Type 2), I need two
bundling models (Tables 1 and 2). Having
explained the forms taken by MNE–SME coopera-
tion, I use the two bundling models to examine its
dynamics. I show that what happens to a cooper-
ation hinges on both internal and external factors.
With the passage of time, the transactional charac-
teristics of the inputs a given MNE and SME
contributes to joint value creation may change –
for example the unique input a partner contributed
to an EJV may be absorbed by the other. This can
lead to a change in optimal governance. If the
chosen governance institution is unable to accom-
modate the change, cooperation will be brought to
an end.
Why Does MNE–SME Cooperation have
the Potential to Create Value?
When are we likely to see MNEs and SMEs cooper-
ate, and when and why has their cooperation the
potential to create value? Let me address the second
question first.
MNE–SME cooperation can be potentially bene-
ficial because each type of firm enjoys a compara-
tive advantage in carrying out particular tasks.
Some activities can only be profitably carried out
at large scale because of economies of scale – their
minimum efficient scale (MES) is large. For exam-
ple, an efficiently-sized paper plant using the
chemical pulping process requires an investment
A bundling model of MNE–SME interactions Jean-François Hennart
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SME 
1
SME 
2
SME 
3
SME 
4
Car assemblers, big pharma, mobile 
phone branders, distributors
MNE
Car parts makers, biotech drug 
developers, app developers. 
Type 1
Type 2 
MNE
Franchisors, manufacturers 
SME
1
SME 
2
SME 
3
SME 
4
Franchisees, licensees, 
distributors
Figure 1 Two types of MNE–SME configuration.
Table 1 Bundling model for type 1 configuration
SME has content (knowledge, goods, parts, etc.)
Easy to transact Hard to transact
MNE has
distribution
Easy to
transact
1. MNEs and SMEs interact in perfectly
competitive markets
3. SME negotiates access to MNE global
distribution platform
e.g., Boeing/Airbus–CTT Systems
Hard to
transact
2. MNE buys or expropriates SME
e.g., Amazon and its complementors
4. MNE–SME joint-venture
e.g., Ciba–Alza EJV
Table 2 Bundling model for type 2 configuration
MNE has content (knowledge, products, etc.)
Easy to transact Hard to transact
SME has
distribution
Easy to
transact
1. MNEs and SMEs interact in perfectly
competitive markets
3. MNE contracts with SME or acquires SME
e.g., Heineken–Van Munching
Hard to
transact
2. Local firm licenses, buys, or imitates MNE
know-how, buys knowledge-owning MNE – or
part thereof
e.g., Foreign PC makers–Lenovo
4. Market-access equity joint ventures
e.g., Danone–Wahaha
A bundling model of MNE–SME interactions Jean-François Hennart
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of 2.5 billion dollars (Energy Technology Systems
Analysis Programming, 2015). Similarly, R&Dprojects
must also sometimes be performed at a large scale.
Network externalitiesmay also lead to large firm scale,
at least in relation to the size of the market.
Small firms, on the other hand, can enjoy a
comparative advantage in flexibility and creativity.
As firms become large, they become more bureau-
cratic. Bureaucracies are characterized by narrowly
defined roles, limited worker autonomy, and heavy
reliance on rules and routines. That management
style leads workers to show greater social conformity,
to be more specialized, to have narrower knowledge
of the external environment, and to be more risk
adverse, all of which hinder entrepreneurship and
innovation. Workers in smaller firms, on the other
hand, aremore likely to be jacks of all trades, tohave a
broader knowledge of what goes on outside the firm,
less respect for the status quo, and greater tolerance
for risk, traitswhichencourage innovation (Sorensen,
2007). SMEs provide therefore a more congenial
environment for ‘‘creative types’’. Hence large firms
might be said to suffer from diseconomies of scale
when it comes to creativity and innovation, and this
can lead toanoptimal divisionof labor between SMEs
and MNEs, with the former specializing in radical
innovations, and the latter in their efficient produc-
tion and commercialization (e.g., Buckley& Prashan-
tham, 2016).4 This is amajor reasonwhy cooperation
between MNEs and SMEs can be beneficial.5
When Will We Observe MNE–SME Cooperation?
Given that MNE–SME cooperation has the poten-
tial to create value, when are we likely to observe it?
I believe there are two necessary conditions: First,
there must be differences in optimal scale between
two adjacent stages of the value chain; second, the
most efficient way to bridge these two stages must
be through market exchange or EJVs rather than
through full vertical integration, since in that case
relationships between independent firms are
replaced by an integrated hierarchy. I elaborate on
those two conditions below and then discuss how
they apply under two generic configurations, one
where MNEs are downstream from SMEs, and one
where they are upstream from them.
The first reason for the existence of a configura-
tion where an SME will cooperate with a large firm
is the presence of significant differences in the MES
at which two successive stages in a value chain are
best operated. In other words, when there are
economic reasons why the optimal size of a firm
must be large at one stage, and small at the other,
the optimal configuration will be one where many
smaller firms will interact with a few large firms, or
even a single one (Figure 1). The larger-scaled
activity may be downstream, as in the case of car
assemblers, mass retailers, or internet platforms
(Type 1), or upstream, as in that of trademark
owners or large manufacturing firms (Type 2).
When the optimal scale is the same at both stages
– and when vertical integration between the two
stages is not possible or desirable – SMEs do
business with SMEs, and MNEs with MNEs.
Differences in efficient size between upstream
and downstream firms can be handled either
through market exchange or EJVs, or through full
vertical integration (Hennart, 1988). A second
reason for market exchange between MNEs and
SMEs is therefore that coordination between them
is more efficiently done through exchange on the
market or through EJVs than fully within a firm,
i.e., through full vertical integration.
Differences in optimal scale between stages
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the argu-
ment. The width of the boxes represents the optimal
scale of production at each stage. The figure shows
two generic configurations, Type 1 and Type 2.
Type 1 is characterized by diseconomies of scale
at the content production stage but scale econo-
mies (or network externalities) at the assembly or
distribution stage. This is the configuration studied
by P&B. Content creation is often best undertaken
in small firms because radical innovation requires a
culture of creativity, out-of-the-box thinking, and
risk taking, which is generally incompatible with
the bureaucratic, risk-avoiding, and groupthink
nature of large firms. In the pharmaceutical indus-
try, for instance, the techniques used for develop-
ing traditional drugs – systematic, but basically
random screening of compounds – differ from the
more science-based ones required for biotechnol-
ogy drugs. The latter rely more on top scientists
(Lynskey, 2006; Galambos & Sturchio, 1998), many
of whom have an academic background and prefer
an SME‘s entrepreneurial environment to that of
traditional pharma companies. While biotech
research is best done in small firms, later processes
such as conducting trials, obtaining regulatory
approval, and marketing, have high fixed costs
and benefit from the experience and deeper pockets
of established pharmaceutical companies. The mis-
match in MES between biotechnology drug discov-
ery and downstream stages, and the existence of
barriers to vertical integration between the two (see
A bundling model of MNE–SME interactions Jean-François Hennart
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below), have led to a network structure in which a
large number of small biotechnology research SMEs
interact with a few established pharma firms that
concentrate on approval and marketing. Similarly,
mobile phone branders such as Apple, Samsung
and Huawei rely on small app developers to gen-
erate the applications that make their phones
attractive.
This network pattern also characterizes the global
value chains orchestratedbyMNEs,whichhave found
that in many cases the use of SME subcontractors
allows for cheaper and more flexible production than
is possible in-house (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Buckley
& Prashantham, 2016). Automobile manufacturers,
for example, use external subcontractors for many of
the parts they need. Lastly, because some types of
distribution benefit from logistical and informational
economies of scale, the MES of distribution is some-
times much larger than that of manufacturing, so it
makes sense for manufacturing SMEs to have their
products distributed by larger firms, e.g., MNEs, trad-
ingcompanies,or large internetplatforms likeTaobao.
In Type 2 configuration, the optimal size of
content creation is large, but that at the down-
stream distribution stage is low. This configuration,
while extensively studied in international business,
is not covered by P&B’s model. In some cases the
MES of manufacturing and brand creation is larger
than that of distribution, for instance when final
markets are segmented by economic, cultural, and
governmental barriers. In such cases distribution is
done by firms that are smaller, but better embedded
in the local environment. The optimal scale for the
establishment of a trademark is also often much
larger than that for local production or sale of the
trademarked products and services. Fast food out-
lets need to be located close to the consumer, and
are thus necessarily small. Likewise, the MES of
branding credit cards is much higher than that of
signing up merchants and providing customer
support, while in internet platforms the MES for
platform development and branding is many times
larger than that for service delivery, which is
typically provided by smaller firms, in some cases
even individuals (as in Uber and Lyft). In all these
cases the result is a network structure, with many
SMEs interacting with a large firm.
Market, contract, and EJV coordination rather
than full vertical integration
A second necessary condition for independent
SMEs collaborating with a large firm is that there
is no full vertical integration between adjacent
stages of the value chain. That is, it must be
inefficient or impossible for large firms to fully
integrate into the SME’s business, and vice versa.
In Type 1 configuration, it makes sense for an
SME content producer to use the services of large
distributors if the alternative of integrating into
distribution is not feasible. As we have seen, SMEs
developing new biologicals or drug delivery tech-
niques have to work with large pharma firms if
their products require large-scale distribution, less
so if they have niche applications. Similarly, large
pharma firms may find it hard to vertically inte-
grate into the development of biologicals by buying
up biotech SMEs because of differences in corporate
culture, as noted above (Tapon, 1989). Likewise it is
often inefficient for automobile manufacturers to
integrate into the production of all the parts they
need, as this would increase management costs and
may not match the low costs and flexibility
achieved by SME subcontractors.
Turning now to Type 2 configuration, there are
reasons why upstream firms, trademark owners,
manufacturers – and in particular large MNEs – may
want to cooperate with small distributors and local
service providers rather than integrate into local
distribution by setting up sales subsidiaries or
company-owned outlets. Establishing a sales sub-
sidiary involves fixed costs, and only makes sense
for a sufficiently large sales volume. Another
advantage to using independent distributors is that
they can complement a firm’s products with those
of other manufacturers to offer final consumers a
full product line. Most distributors have an in-
depth knowledge of their local market as well as
useful contacts with local buyers and decision-
makers, both of which are crucial to selling in
unfamiliar markets. This explains why manufactur-
ers vertically integrate into distribution only in very
specific cases, namely when (1) it is crucial for them
to gather direct information on customers, (2) they
need to exercise tight control on the way their
products are distributed, and/or (3) they find it
difficult to persuade independent distributors to
make investments which are specific to them
(Hennart, 2010).
For firms selling trademarked products and ser-
vices, such as fast food, car rentals, or hotels,
vertical integration into service delivery is not
always optimal. Operating outlets with employees
incurs high management costs if serving the market
requires a large number of small dispersed outlets
(Brickley & Dark, 1987). An efficient solution can
then be to license or franchise SMEs. This is done by
A bundling model of MNE–SME interactions Jean-François Hennart
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some fast food companies that enter into franchise
contracts with a large number of SMEs; by credit card
branders such as Visa and MasterCard that use local
banks to sign up customers and process payments;
and by some internet platforms, such as Uber and
Lyft, that rely on local independent drivers rather
than company employees (Hennart, 2019b). Vertical
integration into local production, on the other hand,
will be chosenwhen the costs of direct monitoring of
employee-staffed outlets are not excessive while
quality debasement by franchisees cannot be con-
trolled by franchising contracts (Hennart, 2010).
Likewise it is usually difficult for SME distributors
or local producers of MNE-branded products and
services to integrate backward into the production
of the goods and services they are distributing.
Whether they can or not depends on the MES at the
manufacturing stage and on how difficult it is to
duplicate the MNE’s products and services. As
MNEs and their SME distributors accumulate
knowledge about each other’s business over time,
albeit usually at different speeds, their relationship
may become unstable. In the next section, I discuss
all these issues using a bundling model (Hennart,
2009; Hennart, Sheng & Pimenta, 2015), which
specifically addresses the factors that affect the
likelihood of vertical integration.
The Governance of MNE–SME Cooperation
Now that I have established the circumstances
under which MNE–SME cooperation will occur, and
the reasons why it can be value-creating, the next
step is to determine the forms it will take. Trans-
action cost theory tells us that realizing value is not
automatic: it requires an appropriate governance
institution (Hennart, 1994). The two main gover-
nance institutions that can be used to organize
MNE-SME cooperation are arm’s length sales and
contracts on one hand, and EJVs on the other.
Since transaction cost theory tells us that the form
taken by MNE–SME cooperation is the result of a
match between the transactional characteristics of
the contributed inputs and the features of the
chosen governance institution, we need to under-
stand how governance institutions work, for
instance how spot sales and market contracts differ
from EJVs. We also need to discuss what is meant
by transactional characteristics of inputs.
Contracts versus EJVs
In arm’s length sales and in contracts, parties are
paid for their contributions ex ante. In residual-
sharing agreements, including partnerships, joint
research agreements, and EJVs, they are paid ex
post from a share of the results of the venture.6 The
distinction is important. Rewarding parties ex-ante
requires being able to observe ex ante the quantity
and quality of the goods and services they are
selling. When this is difficult to do, a better way to
reward contributors to a joint endeavor is to give
them an ex post share of the outcome of the
venture (a share of its residual) (Hennart,
1988, 2019a). This obviates the need for measuring
and pricing partner contributions ex ante. It also
facilitates task reassignment, which is a plus when
contributions are hard to define beforehand. How-
ever, contributors will be generally unwilling to
accept being paid ex post from the outcome of a
venture if given no say in it, especially if the
venture makes up a significant part of their income.
This is why EJV partners are given co-managing
rights.
Structural characteristics of EJVs
As is often the case, the very features which make
EJV governance efficient in some circumstances are
also the source of potential difficulties (Hennart &
Zeng, 2005). First, giving EJV partners the right to
co-manage is problematic when they have different
goals. Goal conflicts arise, for example, in foreign
market entry EJVs where MNEs seek to maximize
global income, while local partners are interested in
the profits of the affiliate of which they are part
owners (Stopford and Wells, 1972). Another poten-
tial problem is that the usually vague description of
expected contributions in EJVs makes it possible for
parties to contribute less than promised, i.e., to free
ride. Free riding is a frequent problem in franchising
arrangements where all parties share in the reputa-
tion of the brand. If reducing quality is costly to
detect, and most customers are one-time-only, it
may pay for franchisees to debase quality, and if
they all do that, the franchise chain will go under
(Brickley & Dark, 1987).7 A third potential problem
is holdup. Outsourcing tasks to a partner firm carries
the risk of dependence, which is likely to be
problematic if it is not mutual. It is also often easy
for EJV partners to appropriate inputs contributed
by their partner(s) to the EJV and use them in
unauthorized ways – the spillover problem – because
these inputs, tacit knowledge for example, have
weak property rights (Davies, 1977).8 As shown
below, Lenovo, Wahaha, Danone and Amazon
displayed this type of behavior. All in all, how
governance institutions are structured affects
whether they bring net gains to the parties.
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All these potential problems can generally be
avoided by selecting the right partner, choosing the
right configuration for the agreement, and instal-
ling appropriate contractual and non-contractual
safeguards. Goal conflicts and free-riding can be
reduced by choosing partners with similar goals.
One can also minimize the probability of goal
conflict, holdup, and spillover through careful
design of the size, scope and vertical configuration
of the agreement. The probability of holdups can be
reduced if partners set up parallel structures that
make exposure symmetrical (Williamson, 1983;
Anderson & Jap, 2005), and if they invest in co-
specialized assets whose value depends on the
continuation of the agreement (Teece,
1986, 1992; Dyer, 1997). Selecting partners who
are not actual or potential competitors reduces the
likelihood of damaging spillovers (Jones & Shill,
1991; Gomes-Casseres, 2015), and so is the merging
of the potentially competing activities of partners
into a commonly-held entity. GE did that in its
CFM International EJV with Snecma, but Ciba did
not. A third solution to spillovers is the blackbox
approach whereby the intermediate products incor-
porating the contributions of the partners are
transferred between them in ways that hide the
underlying know-how (Scarbrough, 1995), one of
the strategies adopted in CFM International. Lastly,
segmenting the markets in which the EJV partners
could sell makes it possible to avoid competition
between them, with the segmentation enforced
through licensing and/or franchising contracts
(Gomes-Casseres, 2015). This is what Heineken
did with Van Munching, but Danone failed to do
with Wahaha (see below). This solution is only
feasible if intellectual property rights are enforce-
able, but many types of knowledge are not
patentable, so their appropriation by distributors
and EJV partners cannot be prevented, as shown in
the Lenovo–PC makers case discussed below.
A Bundling Model of MNE–SME Cooperation
Having explained what is meant by governance
institution, I can now present my two bundling
models (Tables 1 and 2). In both tables content
providers, i.e., firms that have developed content
based on technology or unique business models,
are in the columns, while distributors are in the
rows. Table 1 illustrates the case where SMEs are
content providers, relying on MNEs for distribu-
tion, and Table 2 the reverse, MNEs generating
content and SMEs providing local production and
distribution.
The tables show how the form taken by cooper-
ation between content providers and distributors
varies with the level of transaction costs in the
transfer of these inputs. To exploit content in a
given market – new products and processes or
unique business models, for instance – a content
provider must line up complementary inputs.
These inputs can be purchased in four markets,
those for assets, for services of assets, for inputs
necessary to produce assets, and for firms in which
assets are embedded.9 For simplicity’s sake, let us
assume that distribution is the only complemen-
tary input needed by content providers.
Content and distribution can be either easy or
hard to transact on each of the four markets. As
parties can switch between markets, and will
choose to operate in the most efficient one, an
input is hard to transact if it is difficult to access on
all four markets. Let’s start with content – knowl-
edge, reputation, products. Easy to transact knowl-
edge is that which can be sold on any of the four
markets, or can be easily imitated or stolen.
Knowledge can be sold in a variety of ways. It can
be licensed if it is covered by a strong patent which
is enforced by public authorities. Some tacit knowl-
edge can be bought from technical or management
consultants (Arora & Gambardella, 1998; Zeng &
Williamson, 2007). When embedded in individu-
als, knowledge can be accessed by hiring on labor
markets, a tactic successfully used by Huawei
(Schaefer, 2020), and if it resides in teams of
workers or in firm routines, by acquiring the firm
or joint venturing with it. In some industries,
knowledge is embedded in products and in equip-
ment that can be bought on the market. Makers of
laptops or mobile phones, for instance, can access
up-to-date technology by buying components and
incorporating them into their products, and cut-
ting edge manufacturing technology by purchasing
equipment and being trained in its use (Mathews,
2002). Hard-to-transact content includes some
types of tacit knowledge that cannot be transacted
through the means described above and that can-
not be easily imitated (Arora, Fosfuri & Gam-
bardella, 2001; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter,
1987). The other intangible, reputation, can some-
times be embedded in trademarks and franchised,
but this requires that counterfeiting be curbed and
that quality debasement by franchisees be con-
trolled (Hennart, 2010). To sum up, content can be
accessed on four markets, those for (a) assets,
(b) services of assets, (c) labor and (d) firms or parts
thereof. Easy to transact content is that which can
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be accessed efficiently on any of those markets, or
that can be easily copied. Difficult to transact
content cannot be accessed on any of them and
cannot be easily imitated.
Turning now to the rows, distribution is rela-
tively easy to transact when (a) there are many
competing distributors providing reliable services
that a content provider can access without fear of
being held up, (b) the market for the inputs
necessary to build up a distribution system is
efficient, allowing a content provider to build one
from scratch by hiring employees and buying or
leasing warehouses and retail outlets, or (c) firms
that own distribution networks can be easily
bought. Conversely, distribution is relatively hard
to transact, i.e., hard to obtain, if (a) access to
consumers is monopolized by governments or by
private firms, (b) it is difficult to hire competent
employees and to rent or buy warehouses and retail
outlets to build a distribution network, and (c) it is
not possible to acquire local firms that own distri-
bution facilities.
Type 1: SMEs provide content and MNEs distribution
Using Table 1, let’s explore the case where content
creation is best undertaken by SMEs, but distribu-
tion, being subject to significant economies of
scale, is best carried out by MNEs with international
distribution networks. The intersection between
row and column gives us four cases.
Quadrant 1 of Table 1 corresponds to the case
where both the markets for content (knowledge,
reputation, parts) and distribution have low trans-
action costs. In the other quadrants imperfections
in the market for content have encouraged SMEs to
vertically integrate to be able to exploit their
knowledge or reputation on more efficient markets.
For example, and as shown below, CTT does not
market its technical skills as is, but instead embeds
them into humidifiers and de-humidifiers. In con-
trast, the market for both inputs is perfectly com-
petitive in quadrant 1, so these inputs can be sold
as is. An example would be an SME consultant
applying routine skills to solve the generic prob-
lems of an MNE. The MNE could instantly replace
her with any other consultant, and she could sell
her services to any number of MNEs. As long as the
market for the inputs are perfectly competitive,
there are no long-term issues because parties can
adapt by costlessly switching partners.
In Quadrant 2 of Table 1, the SME’s content is
easy to transact. By this I mean that the MNE can
access it by in-licensing, by imitation, or by
purchasing the SME. At the same time the market
for distribution is inefficient, in the sense that the
SME finds it difficult to contract for access to it on
reasonable terms and/or to integrate into it. Con-
sider the case of Amazon’s complementors. In
addition to selling its own products on its platform,
Amazon sells those of third party complementors.
These complementors, often SMEs, are eminently
vulnerable to holdup because in most cases they are
not the exclusive producers of the products they
sell via Amazon, while at the same time they are
often highly dependent on Amazon for distribution
as purchasing Amazon is out of the question, and
setting up their own platform may be beyond their
means. This is an unstable situation as Amazon can
easily identify which complementor products are
particularly profitable and replace them with its
own. Indeed Zhu and Liu (2018) found that
between June 2013 and April 2014 Amazon did
just that for 3% of the products third party sellers
put on its platform, and that the products replaced
with Amazon versions tended to be those that had
been the most successful. Naturally this behavior is
not without consequences, as it can be expected to
encourage complementors to ask Amazon for safe-
guards or to seek alternative platforms.
As our model predicts, the probability of a
content-providing SME being expropriated by a
large downstream buyer or distributor depends on
the exclusivity of its products. If it is not possible for
platform owners to replace the products of third
party sellers with their own, and if third party sellers
can sell their products on alternative platforms, then
they can avoid being financially squeezed by plat-
form owners, or having their products displaced by
them. Huang, Ceccagnoli, Forman and Wu (2013)
show that app and software developers who sell
unique patent-protected products are less likely to
be expropriated, and also that they are more likely to
be bought by platform owners wanting to vertically
integrate. Indeed, vertically integrating into distri-
bution or selling themselves to MNEs with distribu-
tion networks are two common strategies for
content-generating SMEs.
In Quadrant 3 of Table 1 knowledge held by the
content provider, in this case an SME, is difficult to
sell, but also difficult to copy, i.e., it is hard to
transact. Distribution, on the other hand, is easy to
access. In that case the relationship between SME
and MNE will clearly be beneficial to both parties. It
will also be stable as long as neither party finds
integration into the other’s business a more attrac-
tive option. CTT Systems AB is a Swedish SME with
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about 100 employees and a turnover of some US
$35 million. It makes humidifiers for aircraft cabins
and de-humidifiers for aircraft structures. Its clients
are the two main airframe manufacturers, Boeing
and Airbus, which incorporate its equipment either
as standard or as an option in their airframes, and
also more than 50 airlines that retrofit their aircraft
with it. CTT is a good example of the advantage of
occupying a niche (Zucchella, Palamara & Denico-
lai, 2007; Hennart, 2014; Hennart, Majocchi &
Forlani, 2019). The company has no competitor in
aircraft humidifiers and just one in aircraft de-
humidifiers. The relationships with its customers,
the major airframe assemblers, are stable because
the market segment is too small and peripheral for
them to enter, and CTT’s technology is patent-
protected. At the same time it would not make
sense for CTT to integrate into plane assembly (CTT
Systems, 2013; 2019, Bloomberg, 2019).10
Quadrant 4 of Table 1 corresponds to the case of
an MNE with strong control over distribution –
distribution is hard to transact – and an SME
providing content that is difficult to license, but
also difficult to imitate, i.e., that is hard to transact.
In other words, in Quadrant 4 both content and
distribution are difficult to access. In that case
residual-sharing agreements such as EJVs, are effi-
cient. However, such arrangements are vulnerable
to poor design and to a change in the options
available to the parties. The Ciba-Geigy–Alza EJV
discussed by P&B is a good example.
In 1977, Ciba-Geigy (CG), a large Swiss chemical
and pharmaceutical MNE, took an equity position
in Alza (AZ), a small US developer of advanced drug
delivery systems (ADDS). CG was eager to fill its
product pipeline as its conventional research pro-
gram was failing to come up with new drugs. AZ, on
the other hand, was in dire need of funds and
market access. Under the EJV agreement, AZ was to
do research on ADDS, specifically on oral slow
release pills and transdermal patches, while CG was
to provide drug registration, production, and mar-
keting (Doz, 1996).
P&B (2019) cite that EJV as an example of coop-
eration between an MNE in exploration mode and an
SME with international ambitions, and write that
such mutuality of interests is likely to make for a
stable relationship, the only potential challenge
being establishing an interface between firms of very
different sizes. They argue, citing Doz (1988), that
this problem surfaced in the AZ-CG EJV. While
interface problems did arise between CG and AZ,
there is evidence this was not the main reason why
the EJV was eventually dissolved. As we have seen, a
firm that relies on a partner for key resources runs the
risk of being held up. CG, to avoid this from
happening, decided not to merge its own ADDS
research program into the AZ-CG EJV, but instead to
continue to operate it alongside the EJV. When AZ’s
researchers realized that the know-how they con-
tributed to the EJV was flowing to CG’s own research
lab for its own uses, and that that would sooner or
later put AZ out of business, they stopped sharing.
Doz writes (1996: 72) that ‘‘AZ’s perceptions of the
trustworthiness and forthrightness of CG deterio-
rated over time as AZ saw the company being run
down by CG as CG built its own, in-house, ADDS
development capabilities.’’ Thus cooperation between
anMNE in exploration mode and an SME with global
ambitions can be endangered by attempts by the
MNE to absorb the SME’s content. Another issue not
addressed by P&B is whether the MNE is able to
provide the precise type of customer access the SME
needs. As ADDS became more accepted by the
pharmaceutical industry, it made sense for AZ to
maximize the number of applications by striking
agreements with a wide range of pharma companies.
This made an exclusive alliance with CG increasingly
unattractive for AZ (Doz, 1988: 37).11 In 1982, AZ
bought back CG’s share, putting an end to the EJV.
Doz (1996) contrasts the AZ-CG EJV with CFM
International (CFM), an alliance between General
Electric (GE) and Snecma, a mid-sized French
firm.12 Founded in 1973, CFM has been successful
up to this day in developing and manufacturing
mid-range engines for civilian aircraft. Unlike CG
and AZ, GE and Snecma merged all their competing
civilian business into CFM, thus eliminating poten-
tial spillover problems (Doz, 1996: 69).13
All in all, our examples show that, contrary to
what P&B advance, having an exploration-minded
MNE and an SME with global ambitions is not a
sufficient condition for fruitful and/or stable MNE–
SME cooperation. The outside options available to
both parties and the specific design of their agree-
ments play a bigger role.
Type 2: MNEs provide content and SMEs distribution
In Table 2 we show what happens when MNEs
provide content while SMEs do distribution.
In quadrant 1, markets for the content produced
by MNEs and for the distribution services or the
local production provided by SMEs are perfectly
competitive. One can think of a standard product
handled by a generic distributor. As long as there
are no changes in the efficiency of these two
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markets, the transaction will take the form of spot
sales at exogenously-determined prices. None of
the problems that can potentially arise in the other
three quadrants of the table apply in this case
because the parties can adjust instantly to any
problem by switching partners.
Quadrant 2 of Table 2 features the case of an SME
with strong control over distribution, i.e., distribu-
tion is hard to transact, and the ability to access or
vertically integrate into content, i.e., content is
easy to transact. An SME’s ability to either replicate
content, or to buy firms or parts of firms in which
content is embedded, will put an end to its
cooperation with an MNE. Consider the case of
Lenovo, today the world’s largest maker of personal
computers. The firm started in 1987 in China as a
distributor of foreign-branded personal computers
and peripherals at a time when the Chinese
government did not allow foreign computer makers
to own distribution networks there (Xie & White,
2004; Chen, Qin, Ye & Yin, 2001). Lenovo (then
called Legend) used its first mover advantage to
develop a formidable distribution network and sell
distribution services to foreign PC-makers (Chen
et al., 2001). Through this it gained in-depth
knowledge of Chinese consumers, which proved
crucial when it decided to design and manufacture
its own computers in competition with its foreign
suppliers (Xie & White, 2004). Legend, then an
SME, was able to vertically integrate into content
because the technology of the Western firms that
used its services was in large part embedded in
components and manufacturing equipment avail-
able on world markets (Xie & White, 2004).
Through its acquisition of IBM’s PC division in
2005, Lenovo obtained additional inputs needed
for international expansion: 10,000 employees and
two R&D laboratories, distribution networks in 116
countries, the right to use the IBM trademark on its
PCs for 5 years, and the full ownership of the Think
family of brands (Williamson & Zeng, 2009). All in
all, Lenovo kept its grip on Chinese distribution,
while at the same time accessing technology and
reputation on relatively efficient markets for com-
ponents and firms.
In Quadrant 3 of Table 2 the intangibles held by
the MNE are difficult to sell, but also difficult to
copy. To exploit them, the MNE must vertically
integrate into the manufacture of the product in
which the content is embedded. If the content-
providing MNE can access distribution by con-
tracting with local SMEs, and is unable or unwill-
ing to integrate into their business, while the
distribution-providing SME finds it difficult to
vertically integrate into content, then the rela-
tionship between the content provider and its SME
distributor will be stable and beneficial to both
parties.
One example is Van Munching’s exclusive distri-
bution contract with Heineken, a relationship which
lasted nearly 70 years across two generations. In 1933
Leo van Munching, a Dutch citizen who worked as a
steward on the Dutch Holland America Line that
sailed between Rotterdam and New York, met the
head of the Heineken family and persuaded him to
give him the exclusive distribution of Heineken in
the United States.14 Pre-prohibition attempts by
Heineken to sell in the United States had not been
successful (Van Munching, 1997). Van Munching
promoted Heineken as a luxury beer, and was
extremely successful at it, making Heineken the
largest imported beer brand in the US. Not only did
Van Munching obtain exclusive distributorship for
himself, he also got the right to pass it on to his son,
an agreement that lasted until 1990, when the son
decided to retire and sell the US business back to
Heineken (Smit, 2014; Weber, 2016).15 One can
surmise the reasons for this stable and mutually
profitable relationship. Van Munching’s success was
linked to the Heineken brand and he would almost
certainly have taken a loss had he switched to
another brewer. Thus, content was hard to obtain
on the market because it was protected by a trade-
mark. Heineken, for its part, was happy to take a
chance on Van Munching because it found the US
market unfamiliar – earlier attempts to enter it had
not been successful – Van Munching was a Dutch
compatriot, and the risk of potential adverse reputa-
tion spillovers was limited by the geographical
separation of the markets and the inability of Van
Munching to tamper with the product, given that it
was brewed in Holland. In other words, Heineken
could access distribution on reasonably easy terms,
but there was no feasible way for Van Munching to
appropriate the Heineken brand by purchasing it or
infringing on it.
In Quadrant 4 of Table 2 the MNE has difficulty
accessing distribution while the SME cannot easily
access the MNE’s content. Residual sharing agree-
ments, in particular EJVs, are efficient in such cases.
As pointed out earlier, this type of market entry EJV
can be unstable if not properly configured, with
instability usually caused by changes in the trans-
actional characteristics of the inputs traded. The
Danone–Wahaha EJV provides an interesting
example.
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That EJV was established in 1996 by Bai Fu Qin, a
Hong Kong investor, Danone, a French dairy and
water MNE, and Wahaha, a Chinese SME selling
fortified milk and bottled water. Two years later
Danone bought Bai Fu Qin’s share and became
majority owner. Danone had initially attempted
solo entries into China, but they had been disas-
trous. It subsequently acquired and entered into
EJVs with a number of Chinese dairy and water
firms (Verbeke, 2009). One of them was Wahaha.
Wahaha had established a strong distribution net-
work selling beverages under the Wahaha brand,
but was short of cash (Zhang & Van Deusen, 2010).
Wahaha brought into the EJV five of its ten main
subsidiaries and its Wahaha trademark, while the
other two partners contributed cash. Wahaha was
supposed to register the transfer of its trademark to
the EJV but this never took place. Rather than
allowing that to lead to the dissolution of the JV,
Danone asked Wahaha to grant the EJV an exclu-
sive license for its trademark (Dickinson, 2007).
Danone did not closely monitor the EJV, adopting
instead a hand’s off policy and leaving Zong
Qinghou, Wahaha’s founder, in charge. The
Danone–Wahaha JV was extremely successful, and
by 2006 it had become the fifth largest beverage
company in the world (Hamilton, 2008). There is
evidence, however, that Danone was unwilling to
support some of Zong’s ambitious projects, such as
the development of a Chinese cola brand. Perhaps
as a response, beginning in 2000, Zong created
some 60 non-EJV companies owned by him and by
offshore companies controlled by his wife and
daughter. The newly created companies sold prod-
ucts under the Wahaha trademark and using the
EJV’s distribution system, in competition with
those of the EJV and of Danone’s other China
businesses, a clear case of spillover. Danone itself
engaged in similar behavior when it acquired
Robust, the EJV’s main competitor in China (Ver-
beke, 2009; Zhang & Van Deusen, 2010). When
Danone discovered that Zong was diverting EJV
resources to his wholly owned businesses, at great
cost to the EJV and to Danone’s other Chinese
businesses, it offered to pay Zong to merge his
companies into the Danone–Wahaha EJV, but Zong
refused. That led to an acrimonious dispute
between the partners. After a series of costly and
mostly unsuccessful legal actions against Wahaha
in China, the United States, and other jurisdictions,
Danone finally sold in September 2009 its 51%
share of the EJV to Wahaha for an undisclosed
amount.16 Two factors had weakened Danone’s
bargaining position. First, the EJV did not have
clear title to the Wahaha trademark, making it
more difficult to prevent its use by Zong in his non-
EJV operations. Second, Danone hands-off man-
agement style had allowed Zong to manage distri-
bution, leaving Danone with limited knowledge
and no effective control of it. When the relation-
ship turned sour and Zong resigned as chair of the
EJV, EJV employees and customers pledged not to
collaborate with the new Danone-nominated chair-
man. Wahaha, on the other hand, was able to
successfully absorb Danone’s tacit knowledge. In
short, equilibrium governance moved from Quad-
rant 4 to Quadrant 2 because Wahaha managed to
obtain access to content – it became easy to access –
while Danone was unable to get effective control of
distribution – it remained hard to access.
The Danone–Wahaha and the PC makers–Lenovo
relationships are illustrative of MNEs pursuing an
exploitation strategy in cooperation with an ambi-
tious SME – a situation that corresponds to P&B’s
Quadrant 2.17 P&B argue that in such situations
there will be tension in the MNE–SME relationship
until the SME curbs its ambitions (Path A) or
manages to persuade the MNE to support what it
wants to do (Path C). That ignores the possibility of
an SME integrating into content, putting an end to
the cooperation, and starting to compete with its
former MNE partner.
CONCLUSION
Verbeke and Ciravegna (2018: 392) call for ‘‘… a
better understanding of cooperative interactions in
search of complementary FSAs between established
MNEs and younger or smaller firms with interna-
tional expansion ambitions, and the longer run
dynamics thereof’’. P&B attempt to answer that
call, as do I in this counterpoint, but we take
different approaches. While P&B focus on relation-
ship stability and argue that its main determinants
are similarities or differences in strategic intent
between MNEs and SMEs, I derive the optimal form
their cooperation should take based on a match
between the organizing methods used by gover-
nance institutions and the transactional properties
of the inputs parties bring to the cooperation.
Change in form, including ending cooperation,
arises from changes in the transactional properties
of the inputs and the inability of the chosen
governance institution to accommodate them.
I first ask when one is likely to observe SMEs
cooperating with larger firms, such as MNEs. The
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alternative to MNE–SME cooperation is vertical
integration between the two. One must therefore
explain when and why this would not be the case.
I argue that MNEs cooperate with SMEs because
each type of firm has a comparative advantage in
performing particular activities. MNEs are better
at undertaking those requiring large size, while
SMEs are more nimble and creative. Consequently
MNEs will cooperate with SMEs when there are
differences in optimal scale between two stages in
a value chain, and vertical integration between
the two is neither possible nor efficient. This
occurs in two main cases. In the first one,
discussed by P&B, SMEs supply MNEs with con-
tent – agricultural produce and parts in global
value chains (Strange & Humphrey, 2019: Kano,
2018), as well as intangibles. While most of the
examples I give in this article deal with the latter
case, I believe that the logic of cooperation is the
same for both.
I discuss a second scenario not covered by P&B.
This is when the optimal scale of content produc-
tion – the generation of new products, processes,
and business models, or the creation of rep-
utable brands – is larger than that needed for its
distribution or local production. This occurs when
the final markets for MNE content are segmented
by political, social, institutional, and/or cultural
barriers, making reliance on small locally-embed-
ded distributors efficient, or when customers for
the product are spatially dispersed, so servicing
them requires a network of very small outlets,
which would be difficult to manage if owned by the
MNE (Hennart, 2010).
Given that there are opportunities for MNE–SME
cooperation, what forms will this cooperation take?
What governance institution will be chosen – will
MNEs and SMEs interact using spot sales, contracts,
or equity joint ventures? I use a bundling model to
answer that question. I show in Tables 1 and 2 that
the optimal governance institution depends on
whether the inputs contributed by each party to
the cooperation are sold on efficient or inefficient
markets. A bundling model can also explain how
cooperation will evolve. The prediction is that a
change in the transactional characteristics of the
inputs contributed to the cooperation will lead to a
change in governance institution. Hence the diffu-
sion of knowledge to a partner who controls
distribution, without any change in the accessibil-
ity of the latter, typically results in a shift from
quadrant 4 to quadrant 2, and thus to the end of
the original cooperation.
P&B, on the other hand, argue that the clue to
understanding why in some cases MNE–SME coop-
eration is stable while there is tension in others, is
the extent to which the intents of the parties are
compatible. MNEs seeking new knowledge sources
and SMEs wanting to leverage them worldwide
have compatible intents, as do MNEs seeking to
globally distribute the products of SMEs that do not
have ambitions to become international them-
selves. On the other hand, the relationships
between MNEs and SMEs will be strained when
MNEs seek new content to sell worldwide but SMEs
are unwilling or unable to provide it, and when
MNEs seek mundane inputs from SMEs which
instead have global ambitions. My model shows
that one possibility in that case, which P&D have
downplayed, is that the SME will not reduce its
ambitions (P&B Path A) or make an effort to
persuade the MNE to let it contribute (P&B Path
D). Instead, as shown by the Wahaha and Lenovo
cases, the SME will break free of the MNE and
vertically integrate into content or distribution.
This possibility must be taken into account if one
wants to build a comprehensive model of MNE–
SME cooperation.
Besides providing a parsimonious and compre-
hensive model of MNE–SME interactions, the anal-
ysis presented here opens a number of new
perspectives. First, my model calls into question
the unwarranted, almost exclusive, focus on the
role played by intangibles, such as technology and
reputation. Bundling models remind us that the
exploitation of intangibles requires complementary
inputs, and that the supply of these inputs may
have been monopolized by some firms, giving them
bargaining power. This explains why new entrants
can sometimes use their control of complementary
inputs to challenge technologically superior
incumbents (Teece, 1986: Hennart, 2012). In a
bundling model, no input is necessarily more
strategic than any other.
Second, my analysis challenges the claims made
by some (e.g., Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2019) that
digital networks require new theory. Banalieva and
Dhanaraj argue current theory is insufficient to
explain them because ‘‘while traditional alliances
focus on risk mitigation in the dyadic relationship,
digital networks aim to maximize the value for the
ecosystem’’ (Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2019: 1380).
Networks have long been seen as an example of co-
opetition, where parties cooperate to create joint
value but simultaneously compete with one
another to maximize their own share of the pie
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(Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997). Digital ecosys-
tems are one example, but there are many others,
EJVs, franchising networks, airline alliances, credit
card systems, biotechnology alliances, to name just a
few, which have been analyzed by IB and strategy
scholars (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 2015; Zeng & Hen-
nart, 2002). In all these cases the parties cooperate in
order to increase the size of pie, but they also compete
with each other to maximize their share of it.
Following Powell (1990), Banalieva & Dhanaraj
(2019) also claim that networks are a third type of
generic governance mechanism, distinct from the
other two, the price system – a governance mech-
anism based on the control of output – and
hierarchy – one based on the control of behavior.
It is clear, however, that the network relationships
discussed by Banalieva and Dhanaraj, such as those
between Uber and its drivers, are between indepen-
dent entities governing their cooperation through
the price system. Uber drivers make their living
through the sale of their output, they are not paid a
fixed salary as employees are. At the same time they
are subject to some degree of hierarchical con-
straints in the form of behavioral rules imposed on
them, some of which are built into the software.
This is a good example of a hybrid, a governance
institution that mixes output constraints with
behavior constraints (Hennart, 1993), and one that
is not fundamentally different from that used in
fast food franchising or in airline alliances. So while
the precise nature of the relationship between
platforms and their upstream and downstream
complementors is worth further study, there is no
logical reason to think of networks as a third
generic governance mechanism, at least in the
precise meaning of the term in the transaction cost
literature (Hennart, 1993, 2015a).
A bundling model also adds nuance to the view
espoused by P&B and others, that large firm size
automatically provides market power.18 I show that
this is not necessarily the case. The CTT Systems
example demonstrates that an upstream SME with
a distinctive and difficult to imitate product or
service can resist being squeezed by a larger down-
stream MNE. This is also true for a downstream
SME, Lenovo and Wahaha for example, with con-
trol of a key resource such as distribution. Of course
there are also many cases where SMEs are vulner-
able to MNE exploitation. P&B’s focus on interface
as a major source of problems in MNE–SME inter-
actions leads them to downplay this possibility.
They argue, for example, that ‘‘a platform-based
ecosystem is one mechanism for allowing SMEs
with internationalization ambitions to overcome
tensions when their ambitions outstrip the intent
of the MNE’’ (p. 8). While it is true that ecosystems
make it easier for SMEs to slot their offering into
those of the MNE, this is not without danger. As the
Amazon case shows, MNEs with a distribution
monopoly or quasi-monopoly can use ecosystems
to obtain information on the products of SMEs in
order to squeeze or evict them.
Another contribution of a bundling model is the
emphasis on the crucial importance of choosing the
right governance institution and the right structural
characteristics within a chosen governance institu-
tion. Lose-lose relationships result from choosing
the wrong governance institution, and/or the wrong
structure within one. While there has been some
work on the consequences of choosing the wrong
governance institution (e.g., Powell, 2014; Leiblein,
Reuer & Dalsace, 2002), IB scholars, to the best of my
knowledge, have only paid limited attention to the
impact of the type of structural features discussed
here within one institution. Our examples show that
these features have important consequences for the
stability of cooperation. Hence not consolidating
the R&D operations of Alza and Ciba-Geigy led to
the end of their cooperation, while Danone’s failure
to transfer the Wahaha trademark to its joint
venture with Wahaha made it difficult to control
its unauthorized use by Wahaha’s founder.
P&B appear to equate stable MNE–SME relation-
ships, i.e., those at equilibrium, with mutually
beneficial ones. That strikes me as a simplification.
A stable relationship is not necessarily beneficial to
both parties. One firm may capture all the gains if
its partner faces significant exit costs. Such exit
costs arise when the assets in which the partner has
invested are specific to the present relationship, i.e.,
if they have low or zero value in alternative uses
(Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Likewise,
dissolution of an agreement is not always a bad
thing. It can be win–win, lose–lose, or win-lose.
When Amazon competes with its erstwhile SME
complementors, the large firm wins and the SME
loses, at least in the short term. The cases of Lenovo
and Wahaha show that sometimes the SME wins
and the MNE loses. Sometimes the breakdown of
cooperation results in a loss for both parties, but by
the same token there are terminations that are win–
win. My model shows that both parties win when
the SME has unique products or controls crucial
assets, and the market for firms is efficient, as then
SME owners can cash in by selling their firm to the
MNE. For instance, high-tech SMEs based in small
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markets and selling products with a potentially
large international customer base need at some
point to start developing their international activ-
ities. As Aharoni (2009: 379) notes, in Israel their
choice is between undertaking the arduous task of
building up international distribution networks or
the much easier and profitable option of putting
themselves for sale on the market for firms, which
is efficient in most developed countries. They
typically choose the latter.
This paper is but a first pass at an important topic.
To keep things simple, I have assumed that each actor
provides only one input, content or customer access
(distribution). Another important external input
SMEs need is finance. It should be possible to build a
model with finance as one of the two axes. I also do
not go in depth into instances where governance
institutions are imposed by governments. I do not
discuss cases where parties have chosen the wrong
governance institution – for example an EJV when a
contract would do – only those where they have
chosen the right one, but have failed to design it
properly. Lastly I use anecdotal evidence to illustrate
my points; the predictions of my model can – and
should – be subjected to rigorous empirical testing.
In spite of these limitations, the model I propose
and the illustrative examples I chose raise some
important questions. Lenovo and Wahaha have
shown that local distributors are sometimes able to
imitate MNE offerings and compete with them.
More research is needed on the conditions under
which this is possible. The Amazon case suggests
that an MNE sometimes engages in opportunistic
behavior despite the potential negative impact on
its reputation, and hence on the willingness of
complementors to feed the platform. Future
research might investigate the extent to which this
occurs on other platforms. A related issue is what
defenses content-creating SMEs can muster against
expropriation by MNE distributors. Alvarez and
Barney (2001) examined a range of options such as
slowing down a large firm’s rate of learning,
protecting oneself through contracts, or building
trusting relationships with the MNE, but found all
these remedies wanting. They suggest instead that
SMEs diversify their technologies. Katila, Rosen-
berger and Eisenhardt (2008) suggest that SMEs
delay forming any alliance until they have greater
legal protection and find ways to keep their tech-
nology secret. In many instances such tactics are
unrealistic. First, the need to have large firms as
partners is especially strong at early stages of
product development and that is when patent
protection is more difficult to obtain (Diestre &
Rajgopalan, 2012). Second, secrecy is not always a
feasible tactic, as SMEs seeking to persuade MNEs to
ally with them need to disclose some of their know-
how in the process. Some disclosure is also
unavoidable when an SME starts working with an
MNE; software vendors, for instance, must reveal
some information to platform owners to achieve
compatibility (Huang et al., 2013). The CTT Sys-
tems example suggests that adopting a narrow
niche strategy may be a content-creating SME’s
most effective defense against expropriation, inso-
far as it may facilitate vertical integration into
distribution (since the number of customers for
niche product is limited) while discouraging imita-
tion by MNEs (because the niche is narrow). This
too is an interesting topic for further research.
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NOTES
1The European Union defines an SME as a firm
with less than 250 employees, a turnover of €50
million or less, and less than €43 million in total
balance sheet (European Commission, 2020). The
implications of firm size are somewhat ambiguous.
For some SMEs, small size is transitory, either because
they are on their way to becoming larger, or because
they were started with the intent of being acquired
by a larger firm once they reached a certain size. For
others, small size is intended to be permanent. This is
the case with many owner-managed firms, whose
owners want to keep the firm small so as to maintain
the non-pecuniary benefits which was the main
reason for starting their firms in the first place (Hurst
& Pugsley, 2011). Such firms can remain small and
yet survive because they use business models that are
compatible with small and medium firm size (Hen-
nart, Majocchi & Forlani, 2019).
2In both P&B’s and my models SMEs are inde-
pendent firms, not MNE affiliates.
3Governance institutions (EJVs, contracts, spot
sales) must be distinguished from organizing mech-
anisms, the price system and hierarchy. The price
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system organizes cooperation by controlling out-
puts while hierarchy uses control of behavior.
Governance institutions generally use both orga-
nizing mechanisms, but differ from one another by
the extent to which they privilege one over the
other. For instance, the main control mechanism
used in franchising is the price system, but this is
complemented by hierarchy (behavior control)
through the franchising contract (Hennart, 1993).
4This does not mean that all SMEs are innovative.
An overwhelming majority are not (Henrekson &
Sanandaji, 2014).
5Some have argued that large firms have more
market power. Market power is defined in eco-
nomics as the ability to raise prices over marginal
costs. Firms that have it are price makers, and those
without it price takers. As the examples below
show, market power is not always associated with
large firm size. The fundamental cause of market
power is strong bargaining power, and the basis of
strong bargaining power is the absence of substi-
tutes. Hence a large buyer has market power over a
small seller only if the latter cannot shift sales to
other buyers. As I show below, an SME can have
strong bargaining power vis-à-vis a large firm if it
sells a unique product with no clear substitutes, if it
can integrate downstream into the large firm’s
business, and if it is protected by strong barriers to
entry that prevent the large firm from invading its
market niche. This strong bargaining power will
allow it to profitably stay in business, or to get a
good price if it sells itself to larger firms.
6Residuals are profits, outputs, or any other
benefits that result from the joint effort of the
parties. Rewarding contributors from a share of an
ex post residual is the distinguishing characteristic
of an EJV. Some authors (e.g., Oxley, 1997; Das &
Teng, 2002; Choi & Contractor, 2016) have argued
that EJVs require the creation of a separate legal
entity and hence that partial acquisitions are not
EJVs. Hennart (2019a) shows there is no theoretical
basis for such a view.
7Free-riding does not pay if customers are return-
ing to the free-rider’s outlet since in that case
lowering quality will lower sales for that outlet.
8If they had strong property rights their owners
would have traded them on markets.
9In my 2009 article (Hennart, 2009) I argue that
inputs can be bundled using three markets, that for
asset services, that for assets, and that for firms. I
overlooked a fourth market, that for the inputs
necessary to create assets.
10I am indebted to Claes–Göran Alvstam for
information on this company.
11The AZ-CG agreement specified that CG had to
approve any outside cooperation between AZ and
CG’s competitors.
12In 2005 SNECMA changed its name to Safran
Aircraft Engines.
13They do not compete much on the military
side. The partners have further reduced the possi-
bility of spillovers by blackboxing GE’s technology.
They do that by sealing the GE engine core before
shipping it to Snecma for assembly (Dussauge &
Garette, 1999).
14Earlier in the year, breaking with Prohibition,
President Roosevelt had again authorized the sale
of beer.
15In 1979 Heineken accounted for 41% of all US
beer imports (Weber, 2016) and Heineken’s exports
to the US accounted for a very large share of all
Dutch beer exports (Smit, 2014). Heineken’s per-
formance in the US deteriorated after the acquisi-
tion of Van Munching (1997).
16Reportedly substantially less than the market
value of its share of the EJV.
17Although Lenovo and Wahaha’s strategy was to
expand in their domestic market first.
18P&B argue that the relationship between MNE-
s and SMEs is characterized by ‘‘an underlying
asymmetry in power’’. Buckley and Prashantham
(2016: 44) write that ‘‘all things equal, MNEs
possess greater power than their SME partners due
to their greater resource base and status’’.
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